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EVERY  DECADE or so the state and local government  sector begins to 
behave strangely.  Either  the aggregate  budget  surplus  gets very high, as 
it did on three occasions in the 1970s  and 1980s, or very low, as it has 
recently. Although  a low aggregate  budget surplus  is not the worst of 
national  tragedies, it can be the harbinger  of other problems and the 
cause of painful  budget cuts and tax increases. And for those worried 
about low national  saving rates, a low or falling state and local budget 
surplus  is another  nail  in the coffin. 
There  is no dearth  of potential  explanations  for the recent  drop  in the 
surplus.  State  and  local politicians  themselves  have been quick  to blame 
forces beyond their control-the  recession, changes in federal grant 
policies  (which were  the  main explanations for  earlier budgetary 
swings), or federal  mandates  that states pick up new costs under  medic- 
aid and other federal programs. By contrast, economists who have 
looked at the present situation  conclude that states and localities have 
caused their own problems. Stephen Moore has emphasized  the rapid 
growth  in state spending,  and Steven Gold  has pointed  to states' unwill- 
ingness  to raise taxes.  I 
One goal of this paper  is to answer  some of these factual  questions- 
What  has caused  the drop  in the surplus?  What  role was played  by exter- 
nal  factors  and  by states' and  localities' own policies? How damaging  is 
the drop?  I try to answer  these questions  with some simulations  from a 
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time series model fit to annual  data  over the 1955-90  period. I then turn 
to some normative  considerations-What is the optimal behavior for 
state and  local budgets  over the business  cycle? And what, if any, policy 
changes  should  be taken  to deal with the present  problem? 
How to Think about Budgets 
Readers  of the 1991  financial  press must  have been surprised  to learn 
about state and local budget  deficits. It seems like only yesterday  when 
the large budget surpluses of state and local governments  were being 
used as an argument  for not worrying  about  large  federal  budget  deficits. 
Things  have changed  in the past few years, but perhaps  not as much 
as these statements  suggest. Most newspaper  commentary  is based on 
prospective operating  deficits for selected state or local governments. 
Because newspapers  tend to report  the worst deficits, these deficits  for 
selected governments  do not represent  fiscal  conditions  for the state and 
local sector as a whole. Furthermore,  prospective deficits are usually 
larger  than actual deficits because they trigger  budget restrictions.  On 
balance, other definitions  of the deficit  may be better  measures  of fiscal 
position. 
Measures  of the Surplus 
The most common  aggregate  measure  of state and local fiscal condi- 
tions  is the state and  local budget  surplus  reported  in the national  income 
accounts (NIA). This series, expressed as a percent of GNP, is shown 
in figure  1 for the 1955-90  period. In recent years, the series does show 
grounds  for moderate  concern. Back in the 1950s  it was actually nega- 
tive-the  overall state and local sector was in deficit-but  a strong  up- 
ward  trend  began  in 1958  and continued  through  1984,  interrupted  only 
by a few high  unemployment  years (shown  as vertical  lines in the figure). 
In 1984,  the high state and local surplus  was being used as an argument 
for not worrying  about federal deficits. But no sooner had these argu- 
ments been made than the NIA state and local surplus  began diving, 
from 1.7 percent  of GNP to 0.6 percent  of GNP by 1990. 
There could be two reasons for paying attention  to the NIA budget 
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Figure  1. Measures  of State  and Local  Government  Surplus,  1955-90 
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Source:  National income accounts (NIA),  annual data. The operating surplus is defined as the NIA surplus minus 
the pension  surplus and construction  spending. The vertical lines mark years of high unemployment. 
describes the contribution  of the sector to overall national  saving and 
investment. For state and local governments,  however, an alternative 
definition  of the state and local surplus  is better  on both counts. This al- 
ternative series, called the operating  surplus, excludes two important 
items: 
-The  cash surplus  of pension  funds for state and local employees. 
For budget  analysis, this cash surplus  should  be excluded because it is 
generally  not under  the control  of state  and  local officials;  firm  rules  usu- 
ally dictate  how much  is contributed  to government  employees' pension 
funds. For national saving and investment  analysis,  the NIA treats the 
cash surpluses of private pension funds as personal  saving because they 
are earmarked  for the contributing  employees. Thus, if one is trying  to 
measure  the contribution  of state and  local governments  to national  sav- 
ing, it makes sense to apply  consistent  treatment  here, which means  ex- 
cluding  these cash pension surpluses  from  the state and  local surplus.2 
2.  Moreover,  the cash  surplus is not even  a good measure of the change in financial 
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-State  and local construction spending.  For budget analysis,  states 
and  localities  generally  use a form  of capital  budgeting  under  which  they 
can finance  their  capital  expenditures  by bonds, with the interest  on the 
bonds paid  over time as the capital  is depreciated.  The NIA has no pre- 
cise measure  of state  and  local capital  spending,  but  construction  spend- 
ing comes reasonably  close. A surplus  measure  that excludes construc- 
tion spending  gets closer to the budget  variable  that  actually  drives state 
and local fiscal behavior.3  For national  saving  and investment  analysis, 
it is often argued  that overall saving-investment  statistics  are defective, 
because, among  other  things,  they ignore  the public  investment  done by 
state and local governments.  Excluding  construction  from the surplus 
measure, which is tantamount  to treating  construction  as investment 
and not as consumption,  thus makes sense from  this standpoint  too. 
This operating  surplus  of states and localities is also shown in figure 
1. In the 1950s state and local construction  was much higher  than the 
pension fund surpluses, so making  the two exclusions raised the state 
and local operating  surplus  to nearly 2 percent of GNP. This surplus 
stayed at a high level through  the late 1970s. It was still 1.8 percent of 
GNP in 1984.  But since then, this series has dropped,  down to 0.9 per- 
cent of GNP in 1990.  Since 1974  the drop  in state and  local operating  sur- 
pluses has accounted  for a fifth  of the drop  in redefined  national  saving 
(with state and local construction  treated  as investment);  since 1984  it 
has accounted  for a third  of the drop. 
Although  the two series describe  the early  years  of the postwar  period 
differently,  the exclusions matter  little after 1984.  Whether  one looks at 
the overall  NIA surplus  or, preferably,  at the operating  surplus,  the drop 
has been sharp,  dramatic,  and a noticeable  component  of the decline in 
overall national saving. Since 1984 states and localities have clearly 
jumped  on the national  antisaving  bandwagon. 
There are at least three questions that arise in interpreting  figure 1. 
A first question involves the current  business cycle. Is the pattern  of 
state and local fiscal behavior  any different  in the high unemployment 
year  of 1991  (not in the figure)  than  in earlier  high  unemployment  years? 
In terms of the cycle, the answer is basically no. Early indications  for 
3. To be precise, only net construction  spending  should  be excluded, and some net 
investment  components  of nonconstruction  spending  should  be excluded  as well. There 
are  no good  estimates  of either  variable.  The series  presented  is the  closest simple  approxi- 
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1991  are for another  modest drop  in the surplus-to-GNP  ratio, which is 
consistent  with  earlier  recessions. Also, special  developments  in federal 
grants  contributed  to the prerecession  peaks in both 1972  and 1978  but 
did not occur this time.4 
If there is a difference  between this and previous epochs of high un- 
employment,  it appears  to be more  a difference  of trend  than  of cyclical 
pattern.  The surplus  seems to ratchet  down to a lower level each cycle, 
so that  the present  recession started  with  the surplus  already  at a historic 
low. That, not the cyclical pattern itself, seems to be the main dif- 
ference. 
A second question  is whether  there  is any special  significance  to zero. 
Does it matter  that  the operating  surplus  is now much  closer to zero than 
it has ever been in the past four decades? In saving-investment  terms 
there is clearly no particular  significance  to zero. A lower contribution 
to national  saving  is  just that, whatever  the level of the series. In govern- 
ment operation  terms, there  could be some significance,  but the issue is 
trickier  than  commonly  believed. 
Unlike  the federal  government,  virtually  all states and  localities  oper- 
ate under  legal or constitutional  budget  constraints.  These constraints 
are  typically  in stock terms,  not flow terms.  In other  words, they usually 
do not prohibit  state or local deficits;  they only prohibit  balances  from 
falling  below a certain  level. A state or locality could run a deficit if it 
had previously  saved enough  to cover the deficit. 
The fact that  figure  1 is in flow terms  when the true constraint  works 
in stock terms  makes  it impossible  to attribute  particular  significance  to 
any target  surplus,  whether  zero or any other number.  So the fact that 
the surplus  approaches  zero does not necessarily mean anything.  But 
since the ratio  of the operating  surplus  to GNP has been falling  recently, 
and has been at historically  low levels for some time, the ratio of bal- 
ances to GNP may be reaching  historically  low levels, perhaps  danger- 
ous ones. 
Unfortunately  it is harder  to get consistent aggregate  data on stocks 
than  on flows. There is no series on balances strictly  comparable  to the 
NIA data, although  the National Association of State Budget Officers 
(NASBO) does estimate general-fund  balances for state governments. 
4. The special circumstances  of 1972  are described  in Gramlich  and Galper  (1973); 
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These are now only 2 percent  of general-fund  spending,  the lowest that 
ratio  has been since the start  of the series. No comparable  numbers  exist 
for cities, but the National League of Cities has reported  historically 
high deficits for 1991.5 Together  these data seem to confirm  that both 
states and  localities  are in precarious  financial  circumstances. 
A final question that could be asked about figure 1 is whether state 
and local fiscal problems  have spread  beyond their operating  budgets. 
Here the news is better. The obvious place to look for evidence of spill- 
over is in the market  for the long-term  bonds  of municipal  governments; 
these bonds finance  capital construction.  Changes  in federal tax rates 
and treatments  of bonds in the Tax Reform Act of 1986  affected the 
spread  between  private  bond  rates  and  tax-exempt  municipal  bond  rates 
in the mid-1980s,  but since 1988  the interest rate spreads  between pri- 
vate bonds and comparably  rated municipal  bonds have been remark- 
ably stable  for all risk  classifications.  The stock of outstanding  state and 
local capital  debt is also at a normal  ratio to GNP. For now, state and 
local operating  budget  problems  apparently  have not spread  to the credit 
markets  that  finance  capital  investment. 
Spending,  Taxes, and Grants 
Has the drop in the state and local operating surplus reflected a 
growth in government spending, tax cuts, or cuts in federal grants? 
Figure  2 shows current  spending,  taxes, and federal transfers,  again  in 
terms of annual data over the 1955-90 period as a percent of GNP. 
There  is no question  that the big news is the rise in spending,  as Moore 
claimed.  Current  operating  spending  by state and local general  govern- 
ments  (excluding  pension  funds  and  construction)  grew  from  less than  6 
percent  of GNP in 1955  to 13  percent  in 1990,  with fairly  steady growth 
in the 1980s.  There  have been periodic  tax revolts at the state and local 
levels, and the reason for them is apparent  too-state  and local taxes 
rose from  6 percent  of GNP in 1955  to 11  percent  in 1990. 
Another  piece of news is that the path of federal grants, which has 
figured  prominently  in newspaper  discussions  of the state  and  local fiscal 
problem,  has been rather  uninteresting.  Grants  rose from 1 percent of 
GNP in 1955  to 3 percent  by the mid-1970s  and since then  have tailed  off 
5. National  Association  of State  Budget  Officers  (1991)  and  National  League  of Cities 
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Figure 2.  Receipts and Expenditures of State and Local Governments, 1955-90 
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Source:  National  income  accounts,  annual data. Current spending excludes  construction  spending and pension 
fund surpluses.  Taxes  exclude  revenues  from pension  funds. 
moderately.  Federal  general  revenue  sharing  was cut out in two steps in 
the early and mid-1980s,  accounting  for about half of the drop in the 
share  of grants;  the remainder  of the drop  came about  as part  of the bud- 
get cuts in the early 1980s.  Nevertheless, despite the dramatic  claims  of 
state and local officials, grants as a share of GNP have changed little 
since 1984. 
There  are two senses in which  federal  grants  might  still  have played  a 
role in the drop in the surplus. One involves disaggregation.  Federal 
grants  for income  support  and  medicaid  are  open-ended  matching  grants 
that  probably  lower the surplus  in the short  run;  other  federal  grants  are 
closed-ended  nonmatching  grants  that probably  raise the surplus  in the 
short run.6  Back in 1984  income support  grants  were half of all federal 
grants;  now they account for 60 percent. This compositional  shift is of 
some importance  in the empirical  work  described  below. 
There is another  political sense in which the trend of grants might 
matter.  Politicians  get used to growth-in  GNP (and thus in rising  tax 
6. This  matter  is explained  in Gramlich  and  Galper  (1973). 256  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Table 1. State  Budget  Variables,  Selected  Years, 1960-88 
Percent  of GNP 
Revenue  Expenditure 
Incoming  Current  Outgoing  Operating 
Year  grants  Taxes  spending  grants  surplus 
1960  1.2  3.8  2.2  1.8  1.0 
1965  1.4  4.2  2.4  2.2  1.0 
1970  2.0  5.2  3.5  3.0  0.7 
1975  2.5  5.7  4.4  3.2  0.6 
1980  2.4  5.8  4.4  3.1  0.7 
1985  2.0  6.3  4.7  2.9  0.6 
1988  2.0  6.3  4.9  3.0  0.3 
Sources:  Levin  and Peters (1986.  1987); Peters (1988,  1989). 
revenues) and in grants. When growth slows, it may take politicians 
some time to get their budgets  back on track. In this sense the slowing 
of GNP growth  after 1973  and of grant  growth  after 1976  could still be 
subtly  responsible  for the rise in state and  local deficits  in the late 1980s. 
Yet state and local officials should surely have known that both GNP 
and  federal  grants  were on lower growth  trends, so it is hard  to take this 
claim seriously. 
States and Localities 
The series so far  have combined  the accounts  for states and  localities. 
For some purposes, though, it may make more sense to disaggregate 
these accounts. Tables 1 and  2 do that  for the 1960-88  period.7 
One technical  point should be noted about the tables. In the United 
States and virtually  all other federal systems, the flow of intergovern- 
mental  grants  is downhill-the federal  government  gives grants  to states 
and localities, and states give grants  to localities; grants  do not flow in 
the other direction.  There  is a basic theoretical  reason  for this downhill 
flow. Because of factor  mobility,  the area  over which  taxes are assessed 
should  be broader  than  the area  over which benefits  are dispersed,  with 
downhill  grants  being  a convenient  (though  not the only) means  of elimi- 
nating  the implied  fiscal  gaps. The upshot  is that  table 1, describing  state 
7. This  limited  time  span  is all  that  is available  at  present.  The  disaggregated  data  come 
in special supplements  to the Survey  of Current  Business.  See Levin and Peters (1986, 
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Table 2.  Local Budget Variables, Selected Years,  1960-88 
Percent  of GNP 
Revenue 
Incoming  Current  Operating 
Year  grants  Taxes  spending  surplus 
1960  1.9  4.0  4.9  1.0 
1965  2.4  4.2  5.5  1.1 
1970  3.4  4.8  7.0  1.2 
1975  4.1  4.8  7.9  1.0 
1980  4.0  4.1  7.0  1.1 
1985  3.4  4.7  7.0  1.1 
1988  3.3  4.8  7.4  0.7 
Sources:  Levin  and Peters (1986,  1987); Peters (1988,  1989). 
government  budgets, has an entry  for incoming  grants  (from  the federal 
government)  and  for outgoing  grants  (to local governments),  whereas  ta- 
ble 2, describing  local government  budgets,  has only an entry  for incom- 
ing grants  (from  the federal  and state governments). 
In terms of the numbers,  the growth in direct current  spending  has 
been evenly shared  by state and local governments.  Over the 1960-88 
period  the state share  of direct  current  spending  has risen  2.7 percentage 
points  and  the local share  2.5 percentage  points. In addition,  state outgo- 
ing grants  have risen 1.2 percentage  points, largely accounting  for the 
fact that  state taxes have risen  more  than  local taxes. The recent surplus 
patterns  have also been similar  at both levels of government,  with the 
surplus-to-GNP  ratio  dropping  by 0.3 between 1985  and 1989  for states 
and  by 0.4 for localities. 
Regions 
Another  possibly meaningful  disaggregation  is by region. The fiscal 
problems in California,  Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and 
Michigan  are well known. Are things  as bad everywhere? 
Yes and  no. The fiscal  problems  seem more  serious  in the states listed 
above than elsewhere. Yet more than 40 states now suffer  fiscal prob- 
lems. These budget  problems  are more  easily analyzed  for state govern- 
ments because of the difficulty  of surveying many thousands of local 
governments.  To examine state budgets  by region, I switch away from 
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for fiscal  years 1991  and 1992  as compiled  by the National  Conference  of 
State Legislatures  and the NASBO and as analyzed by Gold.8  Deficits 
are typically much larger  in these data than in the NIA, in which there 
were still surpluses  in 1990.  As mentioned  above, these new figures  dif- 
fer because they show projected deficits on a current  services basis. 
Should  states freeze their spending  in nominal  terms, these deficits  will 
be reduced;  should  they postpone scheduled  tax cuts, these deficits  will 
be further  reduced. Hence the self-reported  budget  projections  are not 
good predictors  of state budget  deficits, though  they do predict  the ad- 
justments  necessary to bring  state budgets  into balance. 
Table 3 shows the simple  unweighted  statewide  regional  averages  of 
states' anticipated  general-fund  deficits. The averages are given as a 
percent  of states' anticipated  general-fund  spending.  For  fiscal  year 1991 
these deficit  ratios  average  5 percent  of spending  across the country  but 
almost 9 percent in New England  and California.  To simply eliminate 
the deficits  would  require  budget  cuts on the order  of $35  billion  (0.6 per- 
cent of GNP), with some concentration  in particular  states but reduc- 
tions in almost  all of them. 
Similar  conclusions can be reached on the basis of the end-of-year 
balance  estimates for fiscal year 1991,  in the right  column of the table. 
Assuming  the deficits  are not dealt with, balances  would be negative in 
three areas, New England,  the Mid-Atlantic  states, and California.  Be- 
cause negative balances are not permitted, cuts of about $10 billion 
would  be the absolute  least that  could  be done. And  though  other  regions 
would escape the knife using this minimum  standard,  most of their  bal- 
ances would still be extremely  low. Historically,  state general-fund  bal- 
ances have averaged about 5 percent of general-fund  spending, and, 
with no cuts, balances are projected  to be below this level for states in 
all regions  but  the Great  Plains  and the Rocky Mountains. 
Looking ahead to fiscal year 1992, problems become even worse. 
Now cuts of at least 5 percent  of current  spending  are necessary  in every 
region  to balance  budgets, with cuts of more than  20 percent  necessary 
in New England  and California.  If the numbers  are taken  literally,  bud- 
get cuts of close to $100  billion  (1.7 percent  of GNP) would  be necessary 
to bring  state budgets  into balance.  There  is no past epoch of budget  cut- 
ting  in the 35-year  history  shown  in figure  1  that  comes even close to this 
8.  National  Association  of State  Budget  Officers  (1991)  and  Gold  (1991). Edward M. Gramlich  259 
Table 3.  Estimated Budget Deficits and Balances, by Region, 
Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992 
Percent  of general-fund  spending 
General- 
fund 
Deficit  balance 
Region  1991  1992  1991 
New England  9.5  22.5  -3.2 
Mid-Atlantic  5.6  12.6  -0.3 
Great  Lakes  5.1  5.6  2.6 
Great  Plains  2.8  5.4  5.5 
Southeast  5.2  15.1  1.9 
Southwest  1.4  13.0  3.0 
Rocky Mountain  0.9  ...  6.3 
Far West 
(California  only)  8.6  33.0  -1.3 
Sources:  Gold (1991, table  1); National Association  of State Budget Officers (1991). Estimates  do not include data 
for every  state in a region. The general-fund balance is a weighted average for the states  in the region. The deficit is 
an unweighted  average. 
magnitude,  which  probably  means  that  the numbers  should  not be taken 
so literally.  But qualitatively  the numbers  do indicate  that large  budget 
problems  lie ahead, that the problems  get bigger  the farther  ahead one 
looks, and that while some states will feel the weight more  heavily than 
others, fiscal  problems  are still quite  general.  If someone were planning 
to migrate  away from fiscal problems, as is often assumed in public fi- 
nance models, there  would be nowhere  to go. 
A Model of the Process 
I now try to isolate the effect of interrnal  and exogenous factors on 
the budgets  of state and local governments  with the aid of a simple  time 
series model. The model is fit to aggregate  annual  data over the 1955- 
90 period for state and local general  governments  combined. Because 
the disaggregated  data cover a more limited period, building  separate 
models  for states and localities would have sacrificed  four years of data 
on the front  end of the time series and  two years on the back  end. Given 
the similarity  of the state and  local trends  shown in tables 1 and 2, it did 
not seem sensible to bear this cost, so I used the longer  aggregate  time 
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The model presented here is a modified  version of a model I devel- 
oped in an earlier  paper.9  It assumes that state and  local voters, or their 
elected representatives,  gain positive utility from current  government 
spending,  private  after-tax  income, and  the stock of balances.  The latter 
stock represents power over either future spending or future private 
after-tax  income. Utility is maximized  subject  to the budget  identity: 
S  =  T +  G  -  E, 
where S is the state and local operating  surplus, T is taxes, G is federal 
grants, and E is current  government  expenditure.  As in the preceding 
discussion, both construction  and pension surpluses  are excluded from 
the model, though  as an empirical  matter  I will try to validate  these as- 
sumptions. 
Combining  this budget identity with the identity that the surplus 
equals the change in asset balances yields the stock-flow identity, re- 
written  as 
B_1  +  G  =  E  -  T +  B, 
where B_, is the start-of-period  stock of balances and B is the end-of- 
period stock. In this equation, initial balances plus new grants can be 
allocated either to spending, to tax reduction, or to final balances ac- 
cording  to the actions  of state  and  local decisionmakers.  The model  does 
not explicitly  deal with interest  payments,  even though  they are becom- 
ing a major  factor at the federal level and for particular  state and local 
governments.  For the whole state and local sector, however, interest  is 
received on general-fund  balances and paid out on construction  bonds, 
with the result that net interest payments  are still a tiny factor in state 
and local budgets, only 2 percent of total current  spending.  The model 
simply  explains  E without  separate  detail  involving  interest  and the bal- 
ances. 
Regression  equations  are estimated  for E,  -  T, and  B. Note that the 
tax equation  is in a negative  form. When  this is done, the restrictions  of 
the budget  identity  hold automatically  if each independent  variable  (de- 
scribed  below) is entered  into each equation.  Across the three  equations 
the coefficients  of (B 1 + G) would  then sum  to one and  the coefficients 
of all other  independent  variables  would sum to zero. And since the co- 
efficients  of (B 1 +  G) sum to one, the coefficients  of different  compo- 
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nents of (B_  l + G)  also sum  to one, so that  the constraining  variable  can 
be split  apart  to give different  coefficients  without  violating  the underly- 
ing budget  identity. 
Since one of the dependent  variables  is the stock of final  balances,  the 
model builds  in a long-run  stock adjustment  behavior. In the short  run, 
some exogenous variable  will have a certain  set of effects on E, -  T,  and 
B, with the coefficients  summing  to zero if this exogenous variable  does 
not alter  (B - I + G). But the change  in  B in one period  will then  feed back 
into B 1 in the next period to yield a new round  of effects. In the long 
run, balances will be brought  into equilibrium,  which means that the 
change  in balances,  the surplus,  is zero and  the entire  impact  of the exog- 
enous change  is on spending  and  taxes. 
The dependent  variables  are detrended  by dividing  by GNP, just as 
in the previous  figures  and tables. The independent  budgetary  variables 
(listed below) are also divided by GNP; the price deflators  are divided 
by the GNP deflator.  The independent  variables  are as follows. 
-The  initial  stock of balances, with its coefficients summing  to one 
across the three  equations. 
-Federal  grants for income support  and medicaid. Because these 
grants  are a component  of (B_  l +  G), the coefficients also sum to one 
across the three equations. As mentioned  above, because these grants 
are open ended with relatively  low federal matching  rates, they would 
be expected to affect state and local budget  items differently  than  other 
grants.  10 
-Other  federal  grants,  also with coefficients summing  to one across 
the three  equations. 
-The  relative  price  deflator  for state and  local purchases,  converted 
to percent by multiplying  by 100, with coefficients summing  to zero 
across the three  equations. 
-The  relative price deflator  for health costs, also converted  to per- 
cent and also with coefficients summing  to zero across the three equa- 
tions. The reason for including  a health-cost  deflator  along with a pur- 
chases deflator  is that health costs now impose a very large  burden  on 
10. Income  support  grants  really  are  endogenous  and  the model  should  have  some  cor- 
rection  for simultaneous-equations  bias. But  it is impossible  to make  a correction  in a con- 
straining  variable  (the  coefficients  of which  should  sum  to one) without  disturbing  the con- 
straints. Since the coefficients  on income support  grants  were reasonable  without any 
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the state and local transfer  system. In 1989,  for example, 11 percent of 
state and  local operating  expenses were for health-related  costs actually 
paid to medical  care providers  and treated  as transfer  payments  in the 
NIA. (With  medicaid  netted  out, the share  is still 5 percent.)  This means 
that health costs will burden  state and local budgets in a way not re- 
flected  by the purchases  deflator.  11 
-The  current  and lagged  unemployment  rates, with coefficients  for 
each summing  to zero across the three  equations.  These variables  reflect 
cyclical influences  on both the spending  and tax side. 
To correct  for serial  correlation,  all equations  are converted  to semi- 
differences  with rho  equal  to 0.9, though  I also tried  other  values for rho 
to check for sensitivity.  The  residual  statistics  are  in terms  of these semi- 
differences  (that  is, for e where u = 0.9u_  + e). 12 
Regression  Results 
The regression  results are shown in table 4. A $1 increase in initial 
balances  raises spending  by $0.26, raises taxes by $0.20-a  clear  wrong 
sign in the spirit  of the model-and  raises final  balances  by $0.95. Thus, 
dollars  that  go into final  balances  only come out with long lags. Because 
of serial correlation in the balance series, this coefficient gets even 
closer to one when lower values of rho are tried. 
With  regard  to grants,  closed-ended  grants,  for everything  other  than 
income support and medicaid, raise spending  by $0.36 on the dollar, 
lower taxes by $0.28, and raise balances  by $0.36. The short-run  effect 
on spending  is relatively  modest  because these grants  are closed ended. 
As such, they do not change  relative  prices at the margin  and  act simply 
as new income for states and localities. But as the balances are con- 
verted  to spending,  the long-run  effect on spending  is greater. 
There  is a vast contrast  between these effects and  the effects of grants 
for income support  and  medicaid.  The latter  grants  are open ended with 
federal  matching  shares  that  average  0.55 across all states. According  to 
the coefficients, a $1 increase in medicaid grants raises spending by 
11. For this variable  I use the health-care  price  in the consumer  price  index, deflated 
by the GNP deflator  to put  it in relative  terms. 
12. Because  of the budget  identity,  the value  of rho  must  be the same  in all three  equa- 
tions. Fortunately,  this  restriction  did  not cause  many  problems-a large  correction  is nec- 
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Table 4.  Regressions Explaining State and Local Operating Budgets, 
Annual Data,  1955-90 
Dependent variable  Sum of 
Independent  variable  Spending  Minus taxes  Balances  coefficients 
Constant  -9.304  2.853  6.452  0 
Initial  balances  0.255*  -0.203*  0.949*  1 
Income support  and medicaid  1.098*  - 0.908*  0.810  1 
Other  grants  0.360  0.279  0.361* 
Purchases  price  0.102*  - 0.080*  - 0.023*  0 
Health  price  0.)24*  -0.001  -0.023  0 
Unemployment  rate  0.111  *  0.000  -0.111*  0 
Lagged  unemployment  rate  0.044  - 0.060*  0.016  0 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.890  0.619  0.901  ... 
Standard  error  0.128  0.147  0.151  ... 
Durbin-Watson  1.641  1.349  1.648  ... 
Source: Author's  calculations.  All budgetary  variables  as a percent  of GNP; all other variables  as percents.  To 
correct for autocorrelation,  semidifferences  are estimated  with rho equal to 0.9. An asterisk  denotes statistical 
significance. 
$1.10 (the grant  plus another  $0.10 of matching),  raises taxes by $0.91, 
and raises balances by $0.81. The spending coefficient accords with 
other information  about the impact  of these grants-that states and lo- 
calities match  the grants  and then reduce other own-financed  spending 
modestly. But the tax coefficient is again quite puzzling:  why should 
taxes rise $0.91 when there is only $0.10 of own spending  to finance? 
Apart  from  this incongruous  detail, the broad  pattern  of the coefficients 
on federal  grants  is sensible. It is easy to see why governors  complain 
about medicaid,  which forces them to raise taxes, and lobby for other 
grants,  which permit  cuts in taxes. 
The price  terms  serve as the main  explanation  for the upward  trend  in 
state  and  local spending  relative  to GNP. After  solving  the whole model, 
the coefficient  on the purchases  price variable  implies that a 1 percen- 
tage point rise in prices raises the long-run  money value of purchases 
by  just about I percentage  point, implying  no long-run  price  elasticity of 
demand.  For health-related  transfers,  a 1 percentage  point rise in rela- 
tive health prices raises both the short- and long-run  money value of 
health-related  transfers by more than 1 percentage point. There are 
other trends  that could be influencing  state and local spending  growth, 
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of school children,  and there is always the risk that these trends, which 
cannot be easily estimated in an annual  time series model, get mistak- 
enly attributed  to the price  terms. 
Finally, the unemployment  rate serves as the cyclical variable.  In the 
first year a 1 percentage point rise in the unemployment  rate raises 
spending.  States have some own-financed  transfer  payments  that  would 
rise automatically  with a rise in unemployment,  but the effect of unem- 
ployment  on spending  is larger  than  would be given by changes  in these 
programs alone-there  seems to be some discretionary increase in 
spending.'3  There is no effect on taxes, and balances are lowered. On 
one hand, this reduction  in balances  feeds through  to lower spending  in 
future  years; on the other hand, there is a new positive effect of lagged 
unemployment,  this time financed mainly by tax increases. There is, 
then, a modest cyclical reaction  in state and  local budgets,  with the sur- 
plus first  dropping  because of the spending  increase  and  then  recovering 
as taxes are increased. I discuss the normative  implications  of this pat- 
tern  below. 
Most of the coefficients reported  in table 4 are more or less reason- 
able, except for the puzzling  effects of the stock of balances  and income 
support  grants  on taxes. Given  the structure  of the model, the results  for 
balances  are a particularly  important  defect because they imply  that  any 
time  that  a shock enriches  (harms)  state and  local coffers, taxes will rise 
(fall).  Hence before  actually  using  the model, I reestimated  the tax equa- 
tion without initial balances and income support grants to eliminate 
these coefficients. The new coefficient estimates for the variables  that 
remain  are shown  in table  5 and  are much  like those in table  4.14 The only 
change  worth  noting  is that  high  unemployment  now raises  contempora- 
neous taxes, implying  that some of the increase in cyclical spending  is 
financed  in the current  year. 
Two other modeling details deserve mention. One involves the 
13. One  piece of evidence  supporting  this claim  comes from  the fact that  there  is cycli- 
cal sensitivity  in  the spending  of both  states  and  localities,  though  only states  have  transfer 
programs  that  would  seem to respond  automatically  to cyclical  movements. 
14. Reestimating  the tax equation  and not the spending  equation  means  that the im- 
plied equation  for balances  is also changed.  I never explicitly  use the implied  equation, 
only the equations  for spending  and  taxes. To be sure,  I also reestimated  the whole  system 
with a constraint  technique  that permitted  the two variables  to be dropped  from  the tax 
equation  alone. The resulting  estimates  were similar  to those of the spending  equation  in 
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Table 5.  Miscellaneous Budgetary Equations, Annual Data,  1955-90 
Dependent variable 
Pension 
Independent  variable  Minus taxes  surplus  Construction 
Constant  - 0.003  - 2.204  3.615 
Initial balances  ...  0.014  0.102 
Income  support and medicaid  ...  -  0.094  -  0.006 
Other  grants  0.114  -0.012  0.169 
Purchases  price  - 0.097*  0.021  *  - 0.037 
Health  price  -0.004  0.008*  -0.001 
Unemployment  rate  - 0.075*  0.022*  - 0.009 
Lagged unemployment  rate  -  0.044*  0.011  -  0.066* 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.445  0.615  0.451 
Standard  error  0.171  0.040  0.115 
Durbin-Watson  1.205  1.763  1.999 
Source:  Author's  calculations.  See  notes  to table 4. 
search  for rho. A high  value  is plainly  necessary  to correct  for serial  cor- 
relation.  As a procedural  matter  I tried  several values before settling  on 
0.9. Most of the coefficient  estimates  are not very sensitive  to rho  values 
in this range,  with  the one exception  being  the speed-of-adjustment  coef- 
ficient, which falls toward  zero as rho is lowered. Hence lowering  rho 
did not make much sense and raising  it toward  one gives the model the 
properties  of a random  walk, which is contrary  to the equilibrium  spirit 
of the underlying  theory. Based on this logic, I chose 0.9 as the optimal 
value for rho. 
Another  detail  concerns  the exclusions. Throughout  the paper  I have 
argued  that  pension  surpluses  and  construction  should  be kept  out of the 
operating  budgets  for analytical  purposes.  That  claim  is generally  accu- 
rate  as a description  of the way things  should  work  in most  jurisdictions, 
but  it is possible  that  states and  localities  deal  with  fiscal  crisis  by passing 
up payments  to their  pension funds, through  timely actuarial  "reestim- 
ates" of required  contributions  to the pension funds or through  cutting 
back  on construction.  The key question  is how important  these kinds  of 
reactions  are. 
I tried  to determine  their  importance  by regressing  both pension sur- 
plus as a percent of GNP and construction  as a percent of GNP on the 
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relation.  The estimates are also shown in table 5. For the pension sur- 
plus, all of the fiscal  variables  are  highly  insignificant.  The only variables 
that matter  are unemployment  and the price terms; the latter no doubt 
represent  the strong  upward  trend  in pension surpluses.  But unemploy- 
ment has the wrong sign, with a rise in unemployment  actually raising 
state and  local contributions  to pension  funds. It makes  more  sense sim- 
ply to assume pension  contributions  are exogenous, as I have. 
The matter  is slightly  less clear for construction.  None of the fiscal 
variables  are statistically  significant,  though  the stock of previous bal- 
ances is close and the coefficient  has the expected sign. The trend  terms 
and the current  unemployment  rate are statistically insignificant.  Al- 
though the lagged unemployment  rate is statistically  significant,  it too 
has the wrong  sign, with a rise in unemployment  lowering  construction 
spending.  Hence both the statistical  criteria  and the pattern  of the coef- 
ficients give reasonable  justification  for treating  construction  as exog- 
enous. 
Empirical Analysis  of Post-1984  Drop 
I next use the spending  coefficients  in table 4 and the tax coefficients 
in table  5 to explain  the post-1984  decline  in the operating  surplus,  previ- 
ously noted on figure  1. The results, which are quite  good, are shown in 
figure  3. The long series is the graph  of the operating  surplus  from  figure 
1, and  the short  series is a dynamic  simulation  of the model  for the 1985- 
92 period. 
When specified  in levels, both the spending  and tax equations  fit al- 
most perfectly  in the most recent  peak surplus  year, 1984.  I adjusted  the 
constants  slightly  so that  these two equations  fit  exactly in 1984  and  then 
used that  year  as the starting  point  for a dynamic  simulation  for 1985-92. 
In this dynamic simulation,  actual values of grants, prices, unemploy- 
ment, and  GNP were fed in; the equations  then computed  spending  and 
taxes; and  the identities  given above computed  the surplus  and next pe- 
riod's balances. In turn, these balances were fed in with next period's 
exogenous variables to generate the next period's solution, with the 
process then repeated  through  1992.  For the 1991-92  calculations,  bud- 
get forecasts were used for federal grants  and the unemployment  rate, 
and the price  trends  were extrapolated  on the basis of recent  data. Edward M. Gramlich  267 
Figure  3. Actual  Operating  Surplus,  1955-90, and Simulated  Surplus,  1985-92 
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Source:  National income accounts and author's calculations.  The simulated surplus is calculated with the spending 
coefficients  from table 4, the tax coefficients  from table 5,  the actual values  of independent  variables from  1984 to 
1990, and projections  of the independent  variables for 1991 and 1992. 
The simulation generates  a sharp drop in the surplus-to-GNP ratio, 
from 1.78 percent in 1984 to 0.78 percent at the trough in 1991. The simu- 
lated value was not quite as low as the actual value in 1990 but did drop 
sharply in 1991 and will probably catch up with the actual value (which 
on early evidence is dropping modestly in 199  1). Almost all of the residu- 
als are in the spending equation, as the tax equation fits well throughout 
the whole simulation period. 
As for what has caused  the surplus drop, most discussion  has cen- 
tered on four possible factors. Probably the one most mentioned is cuts 
in federal grants. Changes in grant policy between  1984 and 1990, how- 
ever, were only a modest contributor to the drop in the surplus-to-GNP 
ratio, about 0. 16 percentage point of the total drop of 0.93 over that span. 
Little of this change was due to changes in income  support grants. The 
coefficients above show that growth in income support grants has a mod- 
est surplus-reducing effect-they  raise spending slightly more than they 
raise revenues.  Hence  while income support grants grew in the simula- 
tion period, their effect on the simulated surplus was slight. Most of the 
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Another commonly discussed factor is the business cycle,  repre- 
sented by the unemployment  rate in the model. It is immediately  clear 
that  changes  in unemployment  are not going  to help explain  the 1984-90 
dive in the surplus  because unemployment  dropped  by a full 2 percen- 
tage points between 1984  and 1990. Even the 1991  unemployment  rate 
will almost  certainly  be lower than  the 1984  rate. The drop  in unemploy- 
ment actually  raised  the surplus  slightly. 
A third  possible  factor  in the drop  in the surplus  is the rise in state and 
local costs, particularly  for health  care. According  to my estimates, this 
is far and away the most important  factor contributing  to the post-1984 
decline. The coefficients  above show that increases  in the relative  price 
of health  care have a disproportionate  effect on the surplus,  generating 
a greater  rise in current  spending  than  if there  were a simple  proportion- 
ate rise in health-related  transfer  costs. Moreover, the relative  price of 
health  care has exploded  since 1984-it grew  by an annual  average  of 1.3 
percent over the three decades up to 1984 and by 3.7 percent a year 
since. (The reason for the explosion was partly in the denominator- 
health prices continued to trudge upward, while all other prices had 
slower growth.)  This accounts  for 0.49 point of the total drop  in the sur- 
plus ratio  of 0.93 point. Alternative  calculations  based on state and  local 
own-financed  health spending  as a share of GNP yield estimates only 
two-thirds  as large,  so it is likely  that  these coefficients  slightly  overstate 
the role of health-care  costs."5  Yet even these alternative  calculations 
give health  costs a greater  role than  any other  variable,  and  it is possible 
there are indirect  influences of health care throughout  state and local 
budgets. 
If these estimates  are accurate,  there  are  two important  implications. 
First, the state and local fiscal problem  is more a trend  problem  related 
to health-care  costs than a cycle problem.  Second, because of this, the 
state and local fiscal problems  observed in 1991  are likely to get worse 
before they get better-that  is, until health-care  and related costs are 
15. In 1984  own-financed  health-care  costs for states  and  localities  were 1.8  percent  of 
GNP; by 1989  they had  grown  to 2.0 percent  of GNP. There  was also a slight  rise in the 
share  of employee  fringe  benefits,  probably  largely  the result  of the rising  relative  cost of 
health  insurance.  Hence over this five-year  period  the change  is about  two-thirds  of that 
given by the simulation.  The National League of Cities (1991)  also reports  the rise in 
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controlled or  there are alternative arrangements  for paying these 
costs. 
The fourth  possible  factor  influencing  state and  local surpluses  is fed- 
eral  mandates.  These are not explicit  in the model, but  attempts  by Tim- 
othy Conlan to quantify  the annual  costs of the mandates  introduced 
since 1983  on state and  local budgets  (that  is, net of any federal  grants  to 
pay a portion  of these costs) yield estimates  from  $2 billion  to $5 billion 
for 1990,  accounting  for a drop  in the surplus-to-GNP  ratio  of less than 
0.10 percent.  16 At most, federal  mandates  seem a minor  factor. 
There  are some other contributing  factors that have played a smaller 
role in the drop in the surplus.  Other  variables  in the model and all the 
dynamic  factors  led to some drop.  The Tax Reform  Act of 1986  has been 
alleged to be partially responsible, specifically because the act gave 
states a windfall  (hence encouraging  fiscal irresponsibility  according  to 
some) and  eliminated  the deductibility  of sales taxes. A series of studies 
has shown  that  the windfall  had  little effect because it was roughly  given 
back  and  that  the deductibility  provisions  have so far  had  slight  effects.  17 
Looking ahead, the dynamic simulation actually projects a slight 
turnaround  (see figure  3). The simulated  surplus continues to drop in 
1991, as the rise in unemployment  adds to the trend effect of health 
costs. It then starts increasing  in 1992  in response to the earlier  rise in 
unemployment  and  the depletion  of balances.  This  recovery  is projected 
to be modest  compared  with  the 1984-91  drop,  a mere  blip  in what  seems 
to be the steady  downward  trend  of the state  and  local operating  surplus. 
It is also modest compared  with the required  cuts in state budgets  dis- 
cussed earlier  in connection  with table 3. 
Hence the lesson of this simulation  exercise is that the change in the 
surplus  represents  a fundamental  worsening  of the state  and  local budget 
position, most likely because of the growing  importance  of, and rapid 
explosion in, health-care costs and related influences, coupled with 
states' sluggishness  in raising  taxes to pay these health-care  costs. There 
is a cycle in the surplus  series, but it is small. Changes  in grant  policy 
added to the drop, but the effect was relatively minor  and only in the 
16. Conlan  (1991). 
17. See Ladd (1991)  for the windfall  and Courant  and Gramlich  (1990)  for the tax 
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composition  of grants, not the level. Federal mandates  played a minor 
role. Thus, the problem  seems not to have been made  in Washington  or 
in state capitals  but in the health-care  sector, where  costs have been ris- 
ing dramatically. 
States and Localities over the Business Cycle 
The cyclical response of state and local budgets, though  a relatively 
minor  factor in the surplus  story, has been discussed extensively, both 
in the public  finance  literature  and  in newspaper  descriptions  of the pres- 
ent fiscal  problem.  In this section I add  briefly  to the discussion. 
There are three possible descriptions  of how state and local budgets 
might  behave over the business cycle: 
-Neutrality.  In this scenario, most clearly advocated by Wallace 
Oates but supported  by almost any public finance  or macroeconomics 
textbook  today, state and  local governments  should  not even attempt  to 
conduct discretionary  countercyclical policy.  18 They should let their 
taxes and budget surpluses  rise and fall automatically  with changes in 
income. Their  budgets  would then be balanced  over the business cycle 
but not year  by year. 
-Perversity.  Rather  than balancing  budgets  over the cycle, govern- 
ments could balance year by year. Given the automatic  movements of 
state and local taxes, this means that the discretionary  fiscal policies of 
state and local governments  would be perverse, with discretionary  tax 
increases  or spending  cuts in recessions and tax reductions  or spending 
increases  in booms. 
-Stability.  Under this scenario state and local governments  should 
do what most economists used to think  the national  government  should 
do-that  is, raise  taxes or cut spending  in booms and  lower  taxes or raise 
spending  in recessions. Given that balances cannot become negative, 
such a strategy  implies more asset accumulation  in booms than would 
be suggested  by neutrality  (as well as more  asset decumulation  in reces- 
sions). But budgets  would still be balanced  over the business cycle, just 
as in the neutrality  view.  '9 
18. Oates  (1972,  chap. 1). 
19. Hansen  and  Perloff(  1944.  chap. 10)  made  an old argument  for such  a strategy,  but 
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On the descriptive  side, the empirical  model above indicates  that ac- 
tual  policies have traces of all three  elements. In the first  year  of a cycli- 
cal rise in unemployment,  current  spending  rises, probably  partly be- 
cause of automatic  increases  in transfer  payments  and  partly  because of 
discretionary  policy changes.  The tax-to-GNP  ratio  rises slightly  and  the 
budget  surplus  falls. 
This  fall in balances  then  forces a perverse  reaction.  By the next year 
states are increasing  taxes to pay for their  higher  spending  and  also cut- 
ting  down  on spending  because  of lower  balances.  In the long  run,  by the 
time all the lags have played out, a sustained  rise in unemployment  has 
slightly  expansionary  effects on both spending  and  taxes, with no effect 
on the surplus. 
Given  that  there  are  traces of all three  types of behavior-from stabi- 
lizing rises in spending  to perverse rises in taxes-nobody  can get too 
upset about the pattern  from a normative  standpoint.  Nevertheless the 
consensus  that has  developed around the  conventional neutrality 
view-that  states and  localities should  not even attempt  to conduct  dis- 
cretionary  stabilization  policy-can  be faulted. According  to this view, 
it is pointless  for states to conduct countercyclical  policy because their 
fiscal multipliers  are small  (goods are sold in a national  market)  and be- 
cause states would be stuck with the debt occasioned by the fiscal 
change.  Moreover,  subnational  fiscal  policy is considered  redundant  be- 
cause national  monetary  and  fiscal  policies can stabilize  demand  shocks. 
If not wrong, several parts  of this argument  are now open to serious 
question. Subnational  fiscal.  multipliers  would indeed be small if all 
goods were sold in a national  market,  but  the disproportionate  growth  of 
locally bought  and sold services is changing  things. National  fiscal and 
monetary  policies could stabilize demand shocks in all regions of the 
country if the shocks were highly correlated across the country. But 
many studies have shown that employment  and output  movements  are 
not perfectly  correlated  across regions-upward movements  or shocks 
in one state may be correlated  with downward  movements  or shocks in 
other states.20  Given these conditions, it may be impossible  for national 
monetary  or fiscal policy to stabilize demand  conditions in all areas of 
the country  simultaneously. 
Whether  states should  try to fill  the gap depends  on the numbers.  On 
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the one hand, there are the usual problems  with response lags, though 
the estimates above do indicate  that somehow state and local spending 
rises more with current unemployment  than with lagged  unemploy- 
ment. Any debt incurred  in the future  would remain  and would impose 
future costs. On the other hand, the regional  cycle will often persist, 
with the national government  either unwilling  or unable to do much 
about  it on the monetary  or fiscal side. In a world  with a high degree of 
spending  on nontradables,  then, there may be some margin  for subna- 
tional  stabilization  policy.21 In this sense, states and  localities  might  use- 
fully try limited  doses of stabilization  policy, and it would certainly  be 
desirable  for them  to have accumulated  enough  assets in the good years 
that  perverse  policies could be avoided. 
Policy Changes? 
Cyclical  issues aside, the dramatic  drop  in the state and  local surplus 
since 1984  is harmful.  From  a state and  local management  point  of view, 
the drop leaves states and localities with little defense against  adverse 
shocks, given their already  depleted balances. From a national  saving 
point of view, the drop is one more blow to those who wish for higher 
national  saving. 
Are any policy changes in order?  Since the driving  force in the drop 
in the surplus  seems related  to the explosion  in the relative  cost of health 
care, that  is the first  place to look. When  one does, two important  prob- 
lems become apparent: 
-The  rise in health-care costs themselves.  These higher costs reflect 
the enormous  and growing  expense of the inefficient,  inequitable,  and 
patchwork  system for financing  health  care in the United States. Until 
that  is fixed, health-care  costs will continue  exerting  a burden  on living 
standards,  the budgets  of all governments,  and national  saving  rates. 
-The  sharing of health-care  costs.  Whatever is done to control or 
not to control  the public  component  of overall  health-care  costs, there  is 
a good reason why the federal government,  and not the states, should 
pay the major  share  of these costs. 
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It is going  too far afield  to analyze the health-care  cost problem,  and 
even the issue of which government  should pay these costs. But there 
are  arguments  for bringing  at least the state share  of medicaid,  about  $30 
billion  at today's rates, back to the federal  level. First, were the federal 
government  alone  paying  medicaid  costs, it could  more  easily reform  the 
system. Already  that system is bedeviled  by having  too many  uncoordi- 
nated providers of health insurance.22  Eliminating  state governments 
from  the patchwork  system will not alone solve the problems  of health- 
cost growth,  but  it is probably  a necessary step. Second, since medicaid 
should  be viewed as a form of income support  for low-income groups, 
there are strong  arguments  for having  the central  government,  not the 
states, pay these costs. Interstate  inequities  could be avoided  if the fed- 
eral government  takes over low income-support  programs,  and inter- 
state migration  inefficiencies could be avoided. Also, for what it is 
worth, survey evidence indicates  that most people feel income redistri- 
bution  should  be a national  responsibility. 
Moving  health-related  transfer  costs to the federal  government  would 
go a long way toward  solving the state and local fiscal problem. States 
and  local budgets  will always  be susceptible  to trend  pressures,  and  state 
and local politicians will always be trying to spend more than they 
should  or tax less than they should  from a prudent  fiscal point of view. 
Nonetheless, one large and growing load on state and local budgets 
would  be lightened  dramatically. 
One immediate  objection to having  the federal government  assume 
medicaid  costs involves the federal  deficit-how  can the federal  govern- 
ment  assume  more  burdens  when  its deficit  is already  so high?  Also, why 
does it help  overall  national  saving  just to shift  an expense from  one gov- 
ernment  to another?  The discussion  above gives two answers:  social ef- 
ficiency would be served by having the federal government  take over 
medicaid, and the switch would make it easier to control the cost of 
health  care. 
The immediate  effect of the switch on government  budgets  could be 
neutralized  by making  the switch  revenue  neutral.  There  are many  ways 
of making  revenue-neutral  changes, most of which also serve social ef- 
ficiency. Many federal  grants  now have federal matching  shares much 
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higher than could be justified on the basis of interjurisdictional  spill- 
overs, and these matching  shares could be altered  with a gain in social 
efficiency.  Thejustification  for the federal  income-tax  deduction  of state 
and  local taxes is tenuous;  it could be eliminated  with a gain  in both effi- 
ciency and  equity.23 
Short of these types of changes, other measures seem like needless 
tinkering.  It makes  little sense to raise  other  federal  grants  for fiscal  rea- 
sons alone-by  definition,  there would be no social  justification  for the 
grants, nothing  would be done about the health-care  finance  problem, 
and the grants would probably  not go to those states getting hurt by 
growing costs.  It makes little sense to institute new fiscal loans for 
states-such  loans could address  cyclical problems  but not trend  prob- 
lems.24  It makes little sense to tamper  with the fiscal restrictions  now 
constricting  state and local fiscal behavior-these  are already  flexible, 
permitting  saving  in good years and  dissaving  in bad years;  and  one can- 
not see how they could be improved,  from either a public finance  or a 
macroeconomic  point  of view. 
Conclusion 
The 1991  state and local fiscal crisis, or rather  the drop in state and 
local saving, actually  began  in 1984,  a few years after  the cuts in federal 
grants  by the Reagan  administration,  and  continued  through  a prolonged 
economic expansion. Estimates  of the effect of both grants  and unem- 
ployment  on the surplus  give modest results not always in the right  di- 
rection. The main  cause of declining  state and local surpluses  is found 
not in the behavior  of either one of these commonly  mentioned  factors 
but in the large  effects and explosive growth  of health  costs and related 
influences  on the transfer  systems of state and  local governments. 
Given this source of difficulty,  there is both good and  bad news. The 
good news is that the remedy seems clear. The most promising  change 
is for the federal government  to take over the financing  of health-care 
23. These matters  are  discussed  in Gramlich  (1985). 
24. It should also be noted that states already have two mechanisms  for cyclical 
smoothing.  Many  states  have rainy  day  funds  that  permit  saving  in good years  and  dissav- 
ing  in bad  years.  If this  is not enough,  they can  also borrow  from  their  unemployment  trust 
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costs, making  the change  revenue  neutral  if need be. Until that is done, 
and  the federal  government  then uses its leverage  to control  health-care 
costs, no other policy looks to have any lasting  value. The bad news is 
that it will not be easy to make such a change  or to control  these costs. 
Another  piece of bad news is that if measures like this are not under- 
taken, state and local budgets are likely to continue under severe and 
growing  fiscal  pressures. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert J.  Gordon: Journalists  have written extensively on the state 
and  local fiscal  crisis and  have attributed  it in roughly  equal  proportions 
to the reversal  by the Reagan  administration  of Nixon's "New Federal- 
ism"  and  to the overly generous  compensation  of state and  local govern- 
ment employees, in turn the result of cowardly politicians bowing to 
pressure  from civil service unions.  I In this  journalistic  view, the prob- 
lem originates  both in Washington  and in the centers of state and local 
government.  Ned Gramlich's  paper  dismisses the role of Washington  as 
minor  and fails to discuss the issue of relative compensation,  pointing 
instead  to an exogenous shift in the relative  price of medical  care as the 
most important  single  cause of the crisis. In my view, medical  care is not 
a separate  problem  that dropped  from  the sky, but is just one part  of the 
general  indictment  of the federal  government  on its mismanagement  of 
the economy. And  the data  suggest  that  thejournalistic  attention  to rela- 
tive compensation  levels in state and local government  is warranted  if 
we look only at the past decade, but is less convincing over a broader 
historical  perspective. 
Defining  the Surplus 
The author's paper raises an interesting  issue at its beginning, the 
proper definition  of the state and local surplus. The discussion, how- 
1. A concise history  of the reversal  of the "New Federalism"  is contained  in Thomas 
R. Swartz  and  John  E. Peck, "The  Changing  Face of Fiscal Federalism,"  Challenge,  No- 
vember-December  1990,  pp. 41-46. For  discussions  of the increase  in state  and  local  com- 
pensation  per hour relative  to private  sector compensation,  see Andrew  Bates, "Blame 
Game:  The Great  State  Budget  Hoax,"  News}  Republic,  November  4, 1991,  pp. 11-12, and 
Gene Koretz,  "Fat Paychecks  Got States and Cities Deep in Hock.  ..  .," Business  Week, 
September  23, 1991,  p. 26. 
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ever, is confusing, because it jumps back and forth between two quite 
different  issues: the effect of state and  local government  on national  sav- 
ing and the proper  measure  of fiscal pressure  for state and local deci- 
sionmaking.  Clearly, a decision about  the correct measure  is crucial  to 
any reference to a "crisis," since in figure 1 the secular deterioration 
comes only in the operating  surplus  measure;  the NIA measure  shows 
the state and  local sector to be much  better  off now than  in the 1950s  and 
1960s. 
To clarify the issues, one can take the standard  national-accounts 
identity  and break  out the two items that distinguish  the state and local 
operating  surplus  from  the NIA measure  of the surplus-government in- 
vestment and  the surplus  on retirement  funds. The standard  identity  is 
(1)  Ip  Sp  +(T-E)-X, 
where the p subscript  denotes private,  and  the terms  are investment  (1), 
saving (S), tax revenue (1), government  expenditures  (E), and net ex- 
ports (X). We can divide up E into the components relevant to Gram- 
lich's definition: 
(2)  E-Ig  +  Cg + Fg-Srg9 
where the g subscript  denotes government,  and  the new terms  are con- 
sumption  (C), transfers  (F), and the excess of contributions  to govern- 
ment pensions over the benefits paid out (Srg).  The spending  item Srg 
(that  could alternatively  be treated  as part  of revenue)  is what the NIA 
calls the "surplus  on social insurance  funds,"  which for the federal  gov- 
ernment  is the social security  surplus  and  for state and  local government 
is mainly  the surplus  of state and  local government  retirement  funds (or 
the "pension  surplus"). 
The NIA measure  of the surplus  (N) of both federal  and state and  lo- 
cal government  is simply 
(3)  N-T-  E, 
where grants-in-aid  are included  in the federal  component  of E and the 
state and  local component  of T. Gramlich's  "operating  surplus"  (0) is 
(4)  0-N+  Ig-Srg  -TFgCg. 
The operating  surplus  leads to a rearrangement  of the original  NIA 
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finance into private saving, government  pension saving, the operating 
surplus,  and  foreign  borrowing. 
(5)  Ip + Ig  Sp +  Srg +  0 -  X, 
that is, 0 is the contribution  of the government,  net of the government 
pension surplus,  to saving  available  to finance  total investment  (private 
and government). 
Now, should  one follow Gramlich  and use 0 as a measure  of govern- 
ment saving in examining  the financing  of investment and economic 
growth?  I think  not. Although  it makes sense to add back government 
investment,  it makes  no sense to subtract  the pension surplus.  Consider 
a situation  in which every term  in equation  5 is a constant, expressed as 
a percentage  of GNP, except for 0 and  Srg. Assume that Srg  goes up by 
1  percentage  point  of GNP, while 0 goes down  by the same amount.  The 
sum of the right-hand  side of equation  5 is constant, and the nation  has 
the same ability  to finance  total investment.  Yet Gramlich  will contend 
there is a crisis because 0 has declined by 1 percent of GNP, just as it 
did between 1984  and 1990. 
Putting  this another  way, the secular decline in Gramlich's  measure 
of the operating  surplus  mixes up two effects, the decline in Ig, which is 
bad, and the increase in Srg which cancels the decline in 0 and on bal- 
ance indicates  a zero effect of the government  sector on national  saving. 
The true impact  of the government  on the financing  of total investment 
is captured by the alternative  operating surplus variable, 0*,  where 
O*-N  + Ig-O  +  Srg;  thus, 
(6)  Ip + Ig  Sp  +  0*  -  X. 
As I will show below, the alternative  0* measure  has declined  over the 
1970-90  period  by less than  half  as much  as Gramlich's  0, implying  that 
the "crisis"  is much  less severe than  he asserts. 
The second purpose of an alternative  surplus  variable  is to capture 
fiscal pressure  that allows one to predict  when the shouts of crisis will 
be heard  in state  capitals  and  city halls  across the land. Here Gramlich's 
argument  is that government  investment  can be financed  by borrowing 
and thus should be taken out of expenditure,  whereas the pension sur- 
plus is outside the control of decisionmakers.  The first  problem  is that 
government  capital  is clearly  not all financed  by borrowing.  If it were, in 
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ment. But the record  shows that  until  the past few years government  in- 
terest payments  were less than  half  of construction  expenditure,  and, in 
turn, construction  expenditure  (used by Gramlich  as an approximation 
for I)  understates  total state and local government  investment, which 
also includes  spending  on durable  goods. There  is also a question  about 
the pension funds; I suspect that at least some state and local govern- 
ment units can count at least part  of their  pension fund surplus  toward 
the constitutionally mandated minimum constraint on its operating 
balances. 
Another Look at the Numbers 
Table 1 attaches numbers to these symbols in order to determine 
whether  expenditures  or revenues are the culprit,  whether  the crisis is 
homegrown  or Washington-grown,  and whether  excessive increases in 
the compensation  of state and  local government  employees have played 
a role. The numbers  are cyclically corrected  by displaying  years when 
actual real GNP was roughly  equal to natural  real GNP. Hence I com- 
pare four years of similar  cyclical conditions. Table 1 leads to different 
conclusions and  points of emphasis  than  Gramlich's  analysis. 
First, in contrast  to Gramlich,  who puts much  of the emphasis  on ris- 
ing  expenditures,  I find  that  the expenditure  share  hardly  increased  from 
1970  to 1987:  increases in transfers  and "other"  expenditures  (govern- 
ment  consumption)  were almost  exactly offset by a drop  in construction 
and  an  increase  in interest  income, treated  as negative  expenditure  in the 
NIA. Only since 1987  has growth  in expenditures  emerged,  being  about 
equally divided between transfers  and consumption. (Of the 0.63 per- 
centage point increase in expenditures  during  the 1987-90  period, only 
a third,  0.22, is due to medical  care expenditure.)  Since taxes went up 
and by 1987  grants-in-aid  had returned  to roughly  their 1970  level, the 
NIA surplus  increased  by almost a full percentage  point between 1970 
and 1987  and  then lost about  half  of this gain  between 1987  and 1990. 
Second, the decline in Gramlich's  operating  surplus  (0) from 1970  to 
1990  was 1.11  percentage  points;  using  the alternative  0*, which  leaves 
in the pension surplus, the decline becomes 0.52 points. Thus for the 
debate over national  saving, I find that during  the 1970-90 period the 
state and  local sector subtracted  about 1 percentage  point from  total in- 280  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
Table 1. Interesting  Facts  about  State  and Local  Government,  Selected  Years, 1970-90 
Percent  of GNP, unless otherwise  noted 
Item  1970  1979  1987  1990 
Revenues  13.37  14.17  14.51  14.65 
Taxes  10.97  10.96  12.24  12.24 
Grants-in-aid  2.40  3.21  2.27  2.40 
Expenditures  13.20  13.07  13.38  14.00 
Transfers  1.98  2.28  2.65  2.98 
Construction  2.47  1.71  1.44  1.47 
Net interest  - 0.18  -0.47  - 0.77  -0.76 
Other  8.92  9.54  10.06  10.31 
NIA surplus  0.18  1.10  1.13  0.65 
Social insurance  0.68  0.95  1.31  1.27 
Other  -0.50  0.15  -0.18  -0.62 
Operating  surplusa 
Gramlich  (0)  1.97  1.87  1.26  0.85 
Alternate  (0*)  2.65  2.81  2.57  2.12 
Addenda 
Grants  less transfers  0.42  0.93  -0.38  -0.58 
Residualb  -0.93  -0.78  0.20  -0.05 
Medical  care 
transfers  0.53  0.86  1.10  1.32 
State and local sector 
relative  to total economy  (1987 =  100) 
Employmentc  97.0  103.0  100.0  100.6 
Deflatord  89.2  94.4  100.0  102.6 
Compensation  per 
employeee  98.1  94.0  100.0  102.7 
Sources: National  income  accounts  and  Econiomic Report of the President  1991. 
a. Gramlich's  operating  surplus  (0)  is the sum of the NIA surplus  excluding  social insurance  funds (labeled 
'other") and construction  expenditures.  My alternative  measure  (0*) is the sum of the total NIA surplus  and 
construction  expenditures. 
b. The residual  is the "other" NIA surplus  minus  "grants-in-aid  less transfers."  It measures  the net surplus  of 
the rest of state and local budgets. 
c.  For 1970-87,  relative  employment  is state  and  local  government  employment  (NIA table  6. lOB,  line 82) divided 
by the total number  of production  employees  (same  table, line 1). These numbers  are linked  to the 1989-90  figures 
in Economic  Report of the President  1991 (table  B-43)  to determine  the 1990  figure. 
d. The deflator  is the state and local government  deflator  (NIA table 7.4, line 20) relative  to the GNP deflator 
(same  table, line 1). 
e.  For 1970-89,  relative  compensation  is compensation  of state and local employees  (NIA table 6.4B, line 82) 
relative  to total compensation.  The series is linked  to the 1989-90  state and local compensation  (NIA table 3.7B) 
relative  to total  compensation  (NIA  table 1.14)  to determine  the 1990  figure.  The index  of compensation  per  employee 
is the resulting  index  for relative  compensation  divided  by the index  of relative  employment. 
vestment  but added  about  a half  point  back through  its pension surplus, 
which  was available  to finance  private  investment.  On  balance,  the state 
and local sector contributed  a net subtraction  of one-half  a percentage 
point to the funds available  to finance total (private  plus government) 
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Third,  and perhaps  most important,  the table shows the tremendous 
whiplash  of grants-in-aid  minus  transfers  over the period,  which drama- 
tizes my conclusion  that the crisis was made in Washington.  Grants-in- 
aid minus  transfers  shifted  from  0.93 percent  to - 0.58 percent  of GNP 
during  the 1979-90  interval-a  turnaround  of 1.5 percent of GNP-as 
Washington  simultaneously  slashed  its grants  to the state and local sec- 
tor while mandating  extra transfers.  Of the 1.5 percentage  points, less 
than  one-third,  or 0.46 percentage  point, was due to medical  care trans- 
fers. The process began  in the last two Carter  budgets  but  can mainly  be 
laid at the door of Reagan's  decision to reverse Nixon's "New Federal- 
ism." The residual  in the table is the net surplus  of the rest of the state 
and local budget, showing that between 1979  and 1990  revenues were 
raised  by only about  half  the amount  needed to reverse the whiplash. 
Finally, what about the claims of journalists  who point to the exces- 
sive rise in state and  local compensation  per  employee?  The bottom  sec- 
tion of table 1 provides indexes on the relative share of state and local 
employment in the total economy, the relative deflator, and relative 
compensation  per employee. Between 1979  and 1990  the increase  in the 
relative deflator  corresponds  almost exactly to the increase in relative 
compensation,  vindicating  thejournalists  and  shifting  some of the blame 
for the crisis to state capitals  and city halls. But the  journalists  have not 
noticed that the relationship  does not hold before 1979;  the relative  de- 
flator and relative compensation  went in opposite directions between 
1970  and 1979,  suggesting  that some of the behavior  of compensation  in 
the 1980s  was a "catch-up"  phenomenon.2  Thus any aggressiveness  of 
state and local unions or passivity of politicians is a relatively recent 
phenomenon  that needs to be acknowledged  and explained, but it does 
not extend before 1979. 
A Broader Interpretation 
What  should  we make  of all this at the deeper  level of political  behav- 
ior?  Despite all the stories about  profligate  state and  local governments, 
2. Going  back  even further,  the 1960  index numbers  for the relative  deflator  and  rela- 
tive compensation  per  employee  are 77.8 and  94.9 respectively,  confirming  the view that 
until  1979  the increase  in the  relative  deflator  cannot  be attributed  to relative  compensation 
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in the past two decades employment, state and local consumption 
spending, and compensation  per employee have been amazingly  con- 
stant as a share of the national  economy. State and local governments 
have increased transfer  spending  by 1 percentage  point of GNP, and 
most of this increase (0.79) has consisted of medical care transfers. 
These rising  transfers  have been almost exactly offset by a drop  in con- 
struction,  and this shift may have been sensible in view of the fact that 
building  the interstate highway system is a one-shot deal and slower 
population growth required fewer new schools.  Rising net interest 
receipts until recently were able to finance most of the increase in 
consumption. 
In addition  to the increase in relative  compensation  per employee in 
the 1980s  (much  of which may have been a catch-up  from  the 1970s),  the 
other main  area of blame  for state and local governments  can be attrib- 
uted to self-imposed  shifts in the structure  of the state and  local tax sys- 
tems. By one estimate, the elasticity to personal income of state and 
local tax revenues fell from 1.6 to 1.25 over the 1980s,  as a result of in- 
dexing, caps on property  tax increases, and a shift of income to states 
with no income tax or relatively  flat  tax structures.3 
But, leaving aside the issues of compensation  and tax structure,  the 
basic problem  comes down to a failure of the state and local govern- 
ments in the 1980s  to raise tax revenues in the full amount needed to 
compensate for Scrooge in Washington.  This shortfall  is trivial com- 
pared with the more important  failure of Scrooge to finance its own 
transfer  payments. Between 1970  and 1990  the increase in the share of 
federal government spending in GNP (2.9 percentage points) corre- 
sponded almost exactly to the increase in the share of federal  govern- 
ment transfer payments (3.1 points), and only one-third of this was 
financed  by increased  federal  revenues (1.1 points). From  this perspec- 
tive the state and local fiscal crisis is a mere sideshow to the failure  of 
political  will in Washington,  where for years reductions  in tax rates for 
the wealthiest 20 percent of the income distribution  were introduced 
under  the smokescreen  of "incentives  to growth,"  while successive ad- 
ministrations  and Congresses  refused  to consider  paying  the bill for the 
transfer  payments  that they had mandated  at both the federal  and state 
3. Vivian Brownstein, "Why State Budgets Are a Mess," Fortune, June 3,  1991, 
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and  local level. Only  a part  of this overall  phenomenon,  perhaps  a third, 
can be attributed  to the rising  relative  price  of medical  care. It is beyond 
the scope of Gramlich's  paper  and my comments  here to examine  med- 
ical care systems in Canada  or other countries  to determine  how much 
of this relative  price phenomenon  is a by-product  of the inefficient  non- 
system of medical  care in the United States. 
Just  as the problem  has been created  in Washington,  it can be fixed  in 
Washington  by reversing  the policies of the past decade. This would be 
a much more direct approach  than federal  fiscal loans to states, which 
Gramlich  discusses at the end of his paper, using the somewhat  bogus 
argument  that  the federal  government  is farsighted  whereas  state and  lo- 
cal governments  are myopic. Even taken on its own merits, this pro- 
posal is subject  to the fatal flaw that it requires  the lender to be able to 
distinguish  demand  shocks from supply  shocks as causes of fiscal  prob- 
lems in particular  states. Texans lived like sheikhs  when oil prices were 
high, and individual  Texans borrowed  up to their  teeth to develop proj- 
ects that soon went sour; then the wheeler-dealers  marched  en masse 
into bankruptcy.  The only solution  for the Texas state government  was 
to accept a lower permanent  income, and any loan from Washington 
would have only postponed the adjustment. The loan scheme only 
makes  sense if it is certain  that  the problem  is a temporary  demand  shock 
and  that  there  will be good years in the future  during  which  the loans can 
be repaid. 
The Real Problem 
To conclude, let me focus on the real  problem.  Federalism  is a curse, 
as is the absence in most American  cities of full-fledged  Toronto-style 
metropolitan  government.  The issue at the local level is income  inequal- 
ity and the need to equalize spending  on basic public services between 
central  cities and suburbs.  Inequality  across states is not nearly  as great 
as within  states, making  the basic argument  against  federalism  the clas- 
sic point that is well stated in Gramlich's  paper-there  should be a 
downhill flow of government grants because of factor mobility, and 
taxes should be assessed over a wider area than the span of spending 
benefits. 
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new way of dramatizing  this. Among the Group  of Seven nations the 
United States is the only one in which productivity  growth since 1973 
has been significantly  below the average over the century preceding 
1973. For the other six nations the past two decades score well above 
the previous  century. While  retaining  a role for local government  in the 
framework  of metropolitan-wide  jurisdictions,  there would  be no greater 
beginning  toward  a productivity  recovery than to close down all state- 
houses and state legislatures  and divert the energies of thousands of 
well-educated  lawyers, lobbyists, and  legislators  toward  productive  ac- 
tivity in the private  sector rather  than  continue  to waste their  talents  on 
duplicative  activity in the 50 state capitols. 
General Discussion 
Alice Rivlin  remarked  on a broad  parallel  between  the decline  of state 
and local operating  surpluses  after 1984  and the unusual  pattern  of in- 
come distribution  documented  in the paper  by David Cutler  and Law- 
rence Katz in this volume. She suggested the latter might  help explain 
the former. In the 1980s,  poverty and near poverty did not improve  as 
they had  in earlier  economic  expansions,  forcing  poverty-related  spend- 
ing to stay high. At the same time, real revenue growth  was held down 
by the fact that real incomes grew rapidly  only for the highest-income 
individuals, who are taxed relatively lightly by states and localities. 
James Poterba added that for taxpayers who itemize deductions the 
sales tax has become a more  expensive way of financing  states' expendi- 
tures because the 1986  tax reform  eliminated  the deductibility  of state 
sales tax against  federal  tax liabilities.  If this change  influenced  the me- 
dian voter, it might  have made it more difficult  for states to raise reve- 
nue. Gramlich  noted that, paradoxically,  states' reliance  on sales taxes 
has increased  rather  than decreased since the Tax Reform  Act of 1986. 
Benjamin  Friedman  speculated that the recent unwillingness  of state 
and  local governments  to raise taxes, or even to sustain  current  tax lev- 
els, may reflect dated thinking  from the early days of the tax revolt. 
When  Proposition  13  was passed in California,  the state had  a very large 
operating  surplus.  At that  time, and in other states in subsequent  years, 
revenue  growth  could be limited  without  reducing  spending.  By the late 
1980s, when spending  needs required  more revenues, taxpayer resis- Edward M. Gramlich  285 
tance based on the earlier  experience continued  to make it difficult  to 
raise them. 
Robert Barro agreed with Gramlich's  treatment  of state and local 
pension  surpluses  as part  of private  saving  rather  than  as part  of the gov- 
ernment  surplus;  he suggested  that  the reasoning  should  be extended to 
social security and government  budget surpluses more generally. Al- 
though granting  that individuals might have better-defined  property 
rights  in state and local pension funds than they do in social security  or 
in government  net worth,  he nonetheless  regarded  any division  between 
public  and  private  components  of saving  as fundamentally  arbitrary  and 
not very informative. 
Olivier Blanchard  suggested that increases in the state expenditure 
deflator may stem more from the behavior of the states than from 
changes in the costs they face. He noted that the state expenditure  de- 
flator  consists primarily  of wages and  that states have considerable  con- 
trol over the rate of this wage growth. Lawrence Katz added that al- 
though  state and local government  wages rose at about  the same rate as 
private  sector wages over the past decade, state and  local compensation 
rose noticeably  faster because of rapid  increases in pension plans and 
other fringe benefits. He also noted that real wages of state and local 
government  employees, many of whom are relatively less educated, 
changed  little in the 1980s,  while real  wages for less educated  workers  in 
the private  sector dropped  by about  20 percent. 286  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
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